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Abstract 
 
We build upon a Markov-Switching Bayesian Vector Autoregression (MSBVAR) model to 
study how the credit default swaps market in the euro area becomes an important chain in the 
propagation of shocks through the entire financial system. The study sheds light on the 
regime-dependent interconnectedness between the risk of investing in banking and public 
sector bonds and provides novel evidence that a rise in sovereign debt, due to the 
countercyclical fiscal policy measures, is perceived by stock market investors as a burden on 
growth prospects. We also document that government interventions in the banking sector 
deteriorate the credit risk of sovereign debt. Higher risk premium required by investors for 
holding riskier government bonds depresses the sovereign debt market, it impairs banks‟ 
balance sheets, and it depresses the collateral value of loans leading to bank retrenchment. 
The ensuing two-way banking-fiscal feedback loop indicates that government interventions 
do not necessarily stabilize the banking sector.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis that followed the default of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008 highlighted the threat of collapse of financial institutions, alarmed the authorities, 
prompted large-scale state-funded rescue packages in the euro area
1
, and led to an astonishing 
increase in banks‟ credit default swaps (BCDS)2. In the first place, those state-funded bank 
bailouts triggered an unprecedented deterioration in public finances of the world‟s major 
advanced economies in a peacetime period (Hryckiewicz 2014).
3
 In the second place, 
shrinking public finances provoked fiscal imbalances in the euro area, reflected in the 
unprecedented increase in sovereign credit default swap (SCDS) spreads.
4
  
Have tax-payer financed, colossal government rescue packages improved banking 
stability? Or, contrary to the conventional wisdom, have they destabilized the banking sector? 
What is the feedback effect – positive or negative – of bank bailouts on public finances, the 
risk of investment in government debt and the price of insurance against such risk? Is there 
evidence of regime-dependent interconnectedness between banking and public sector 
stability? Research into credit default swaps is dominated by the examination of i) the 
determinants of sovereign credit risk and defaults (Breitenfellner and Wagner 2012, 
Aizenman et al. 2013, Ang and Longstaff 2013 and Beirne and Fratzscher 2013), ii) the 
adverse effects to the banking sector during sovereign defaults (Panageas 2010, Acharya and 
Rajan 2013), and iii) the cost of bank bailouts to the government (Gorton and Huang 2004; 
Diamond and Rajan 2005). Only recently, studies on two-way feedback effects between the 
risk of default in the banking and public sectors have emerged (Reinhart and Rogoff 2011, 
Alter and Schüler 2012, Acharya et al. 2013 and Gennaioli et al. 2014). Key in this research 
                                                          
1
 The threat of total collapse of large financial institutions provoked large-scale rescue packages, announced by 
euro area governments in September 2008 in an attempt to increase the resilience of the banking sector. 
(Attinasi et al. 2009, Petrovic and Tutsch 2009, Veronesi and Zingales 2010, Calice et al. 2013, Phillipon and 
Schnabl 2013) 
2
 A credit default swap (CDS) is currently the most popular credit derivative, and it serves as a key indicator for 
the level of credit risk (for a more detailed information on credit default swaps, see Appendix A). It can be used 
by investors for hedging and speculation. 
3
 From 2007 to 2011, the government debt ratio as a percentage of GDP increased in all euro area countries. The 
increase in the debt ratio was documented to range from 9.3 percentage points (Cyprus) to 62.3 percentage 
points (Ireland) (Grammatikos and Vermeulen 2012). 
4
 In the case of government debt, investors use CDSs to express a view about the creditworthiness of a 
government, and to protect themselves in the event of a country default or in the event of debt restructuring. 
Financial markets developed the CDS on government debt as a flexible instrument to hedge and trade sovereign 
credit risk. Although CDSs on government debt are only a fraction of countries‟ outstanding debt market, their 
importance has been growing rapidly since 2008, especially in advanced economies where the creditworthiness 
of some of these countries have experienced enormous pressure. With the intensified attention, their usage has 
come under more scrutiny. 
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is the possibility – hitherto empirically unaccounted for by the existing literature – that 
financial crises and government interventions in the banking sector can alter the structure of 
such effects thus aggravating the two-way banking-fiscal feedback loop. Uncertainty 
surrounding future credit ratings is identified in this study as a catalyst for the aforementioned 
loop. In this regard, our study conceptually resembles Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), who 
ascribe financial instability to the role of government interventions.  
In an attempt to fill this gap, the first and foremost objective of our research consists 
of examining the regime-dependent interdependence between the euro area BCDS and SCDS 
spreads. In particular, we focus on the two-way feedback effects between sovereign and 
banking sector‟s risks in euro area countries. We build on and extend Alexander and Kaeck 
(2008), who document evidence of pronounced regime-dependent behavior in the CDS 
market. Our research also corroborates Riedel et al. (2013), who identify regime-dependent 
sovereign credit risk determinants in four major Latin American economies. This 
methodology conveniently allows testing for the theoretical effects of sovereign defaults on 
the domestic private (banking and non-banking) sector derived by Sandleris (2014), and it 
complements the empirical effects on the domestic banking sector, documented by Correa et 
al. (2013). 
Further, one could argue that the credit risk was simply metastasized and transferred, 
through bailouts (Arghyrou and Kontonikas 2012), from the banking to the public sector. 
However, only temporary improvement in the levels of perceived credit risk in the banking 
sector could be witnessed after bank bailouts. Indeed, by the first quarter of 2009, BCDS 
contracts were traded again at par with SCDS contracts. Since November 2009, several 
“peripheral” euro area countries, including Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy, have 
faced episodes of heightened turbulence in their sovereign debt markets and thus rising SCDS 
spreads (Bolton and Jeanne 2011). Hence, not surprisingly, the CDS market has recently 
received renewed attention from investors, policy makers, regulators and researchers. The 
ensuing sudden credit squeeze and liquidity dry-up induced stock market investors to seek 
protection and insurance against the increased probability of default. Thus, there are 
anecdotal evidences that the CDS market reflects developments in both credit and stock 
markets.  
Against such evidence, our second objective is to achieve a better understanding of 
the regime-dependent relation between stock and credit markets. Further, the relation 
between credit and stock markets underscores the effects of stock market variables on credit 
market variables (see Zhang et al. 2009, Cao et al. 2010, Arouri et al. 2014, inter alia). While 
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our methodology accounts for information contents of CDS and stock markets, and the stance 
of a business cycle, we also allow stock market returns and volatility to be endogenously 
determined by using BCDS and SCDS spreads. To the best of our knowledge this approach is 
not apparent in the literature. The direction of the interdependence between stock and credit 
markets has become a bone of contention only recently (Norden and Weber 2009, Hilscher et 
al. 2013). However, evidence on whether and, if so, how CDS spreads are informative about 
stock market returns and volatility, remains scant (see, e.g., Wang and Bhar 2014). 
Our research significantly contributes to the literature that studies the effects of large-
scale rescue packages (i.e. government interventions) provided by euro area governments to 
their national banking sectors on BCDS and SCDS spreads.
5
 Our results are supportive of the 
hypothesis that government interventions in the banking sector lead to a credit risk transfer 
from the banking to the public sector. Additionally, the results support the two-way feedback 
hypothesis
6
, and the hypothesis advanced by Gennaioli et al. (2014) and Sandleris (2014), 
which states that the expectation of support from national governments allows banks to be 
more leveraged, and therefore more vulnerable to sovereign defaults. Notably, our key 
contribution is to show that the above mentioned banking-fiscal feedback loop intensifies in a 
more volatile regime. Overall, we provide novel evidence that large-scale rescue packages do 
not necessarily stabilize the banking sector, as witnessed by rising BCDS spreads.  
Second, we contribute to the literature which studies the relation between credit 
market and stock market variables (see, e.g. Trutwein and Schiereck 2011; Breitenfellner and 
Wagner 2012). The empirical results unambiguously show that an unanticipated increase in 
BCDS and SCDS spreads provokes a surge in investors‟ expectations of stock market 
volatility (as measured by the VSTOXX volatility index), and it leads to a decrease in the 
EUROSTOXX stock market index. Uniquely and innovatively, the effects of shocks to 
BCDS and SCDS spreads on the VSTOXX volatility index and on the EUROSTOXX stock 
index are larger and more significant a more volatile regime. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the hypotheses that 
are tested in this research. Section 3 outlines the methodology. Section 4 describes the 
characteristics of the dataset. Section 5 analyzes the estimation results. Section 6 presents the 
concluding remarks. 
                                                          
5
 Unlike Alter and Schüler (2012) who model the relation between BCDS and SCDS spreads by means of a 
single-regime VAR model, the Markov-Switching Bayesian Vector Autoregression (MSBVAR) model we use 
sheds light on a significant regime-dependent interdependence between these variables. 
6
 The feedback hypothesis implies that higher risk premium required by investors for holding government bonds 
depresses the sovereign bond market, it impairs balance sheets of the banking sector, and it depresses the 
collateral value of loans.  
5 
 
 
2. The Hypotheses 
In this section, we formulate the hypotheses used in our research. The hypotheses 
build on the relation among BCDS and SCDS spreads, the EUROSTOXX stock market index 
and the volatility index VSTOXX in low, intermediate and high volatility regimes of the CDS 
market. Our research identifies three regimes in the credit default swap market (see also 
section 5). These are low, intermediate and high volatility regimes. Before the subprime 
mortgage crisis (i.e., before July 2007), the CDS market experienced the low-volatility 
regime, with both BCDS and SCDS spreads showing a tendency to decrease. The 
intermediate volatility regime commenced in July 2007, when HSBC announced large 
subprime-mortgage related losses (Eichengreen et al. 2012). The high-volatility regime was 
triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers (September 2008), when financial contagion 
spilled over from the United States to European countries (Calice et al. 2013), and when euro 
are governments provided large-scale rescue packages to their national banking sectors. In 
the high-volatility regime, BCDS and SCDS spreads experienced an unprecedented hike that 
was followed again by a relatively calmer intermediate-volatility period with some tendency 
for the high-volatility state to recur during the sovereign debt crisis that commenced in the 
late 2009 in a number of peripheral euro area countries. These developments are illustrated in 
Panel A of Figure 1. 
– Please Insert Figure 1 about here – 
 
2.1 The Fundamentals Channel Hypothesis 
Following Gerlach et al. (2010), and Acharya et al. (2013), a systemic banking crisis 
causes a business-cycle recession, which weakens public finances and leads to a higher 
default risk of sovereign bonds. Financial institutions that suffer unanticipated outflow of 
deposits and experience funding and liquidity issues in the wholesale market are forced to 
reduce their lending activity and even to call back existing loans in order to deleverage their 
balance sheets. This raises the probability of default on banks‟ liabilities and is associated 
with an increase in BCDS spread. If funding and liquidity problems become a commonplace 
in the banking sector, money supply decreases because credit conditions deteriorate (i.e. less 
credit is available to finance projects in the economy). Thus, a systemic banking crisis 
prompts a recessionary effect on investment, consumption, income, and adverse effects on 
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public finances. As a result, sovereign credit default risk will increase. Therefore, the first 
part of the Fundamentals Channel Hypothesis implies that:   
Hypothesis 1.1. A positive change in banks’ credit default swap spread is followed by a 
positive change in sovereign credit default spread, irrespective of the sovereign credit default 
market regime. 
The hypothesis is also supported by the existence of implicit government guarantees to the 
banking sector. Also, we formulate a second part of this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1.2.  In a more volatile credit default swap market regime, changes in the credit 
risk of banks have a stronger effect on the sovereign credit risk than in a less volatile regime. 
Following a systemic banking crisis, uncertainty about future economic prospects 
grows rapidly, driving lower the sovereign creditworthiness (i.e. SCDS spread increases 
reflecting higher credit risk), and thus, the CDS market enters a more volatile regime. To 
alleviate perceptions of systemic risk in the banking sector, the government intervenes by 
acquiring partly or fully the nearly-collapsed banks and re-capitalizes them. As the 
government effectively increases its share of non-performing assets, public finances 
deteriorate and consequently the bank‟s credit risk is transferred to the public sector (Attinasi 
et al. 2009). In a higher volatility regime, markets penalize fiscal imbalances more strongly 
than in a less volatile regime, notably before the collapse of Lehman Brothers (Von Hagen et 
al. 2011). In contrast to Alter and Schüler‟s (2012) research into individual countries‟ 
experiences, we argue that the private-to-public transfer of credit risk is also a characteristic 
at the level of the euro area. We expect that a positive change in both the level and the 
volatility of BCDS spread will be followed by a positive change in the level of SCDS spread. 
 
2.2 The Balance-Sheet Hypothesis 
Following Acharya et al. (2013), the weakening of public finances increases the 
probability of default on sovereign debt. As the probability of default increases, investors will 
require higher risk premium on investments in sovereign bonds. Higher risk premium 
depresses the sovereign bond market and impairs balance sheets of bond holders, mainly 
banks. 
Hypothesis 2.1. A positive change in SCDS spread is followed by a positive change in BCDS 
spread. 
In the extant literature, most researchers identify that government interventions 
mitigate the consequences of a systemic banking crisis, since credit risk is transferred to the 
public sector (Ejsing and Lemke 2011, Dieckman and Plank 2012). Therefore, following this 
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argument, BCDS spread should decrease. Notwithstanding, this argument has received only a 
weak empirical support. Indeed, after the implementation of large-scale rescue packages 
provided by governments in the euro area to their national banking sectors in October 2008, 
BCDS spreads temporarily decreased, only to recuperate to its previous level soon after. 
However, the mechanism used to transfer risk from the banking sector to the sovereign 
issuers was constrained by the credibility of government contingent liabilities to the banking 
sector (Alter and Schüler 2012). Hence, we can now formulate the second part of this 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2.2. The response of BCDS spread to changes in SCDS spread is greater in a 
more volatile CDS market regime as opposed to a less volatile regime. 
7
 
In accordance with Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) and Athanasoglu et al. (2014), 
who underscore the pro-cyclicality of sovereign debt rating and of the banking sector, an 
increase in the credit risk on sovereign debt will lead to a greater increase in the banking 
sector‟s credit risk through a reduction in the value of banks‟ assets and bank retrenchment in 
a more volatile CDS market regime. Historically, episodes of sovereign defaults that occurred 
in emerging market economies, notably in Ecuador and Russia, led to large losses in their 
national banking sectors (see also IMF 2002). In developed economies, stronger financial 
institutions amplify the adverse effects of sovereign defaults on financial intermediation by 
allowing domestic banks to boost leverage (Gennaioli et al. 2014 and Sandleris 2014). 
 
2.3 The Expected Volatility Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 3.1.  Positive changes in the CDS spreads are followed by positive changes in the 
VSTOXX volatility index. 
Unobservable firm‟s asset volatility can be approximated reasonably well by the 
VSTOXX volatility index, similar to Alexander and Kaeck (2008). An increase in the BCDS 
spread generates greater uncertainty and may delay investment decisions. Stock market 
investors may decide to rebalance their asset portfolios, and thus increasing exposure to 
stocks that are less dependent on bank lending. Additionally, the downgrading of sovereign 
bonds – that contributes to higher SCDS spread – can raise the cost of borrowing for 
governments. As a result, governments may offset the adverse budget effect of higher cost of 
borrowing through levying taxes on firms. The ensuing reduction in firms‟ future stream of 
                                                          
7
 Acharya et al. (2013) assert that a shock to the sovereign‟s credit risk should impact the financial sector‟s 
credit risk through three channels: (a) on-going bailout payments and subsidies, (b) direct holdings of sovereign 
debt and (c) explicit and implicit government guarantees. 
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profits is conducive to financial instability (Kaminsky and Schmukler 2002). Furthermore, an 
unfavourable change in sovereign rating that reflects an increase in the sovereign credit risk 
(Afonso et al. 2012) can aggravate financial instability (Afonso et al. 2014). 
Hypothesis 3.2. The response of firm value volatility is greater in a more volatile credit 
default swap market regime as opposed to a less volatile regime. 
Elevated volatility impairs informational contents of the credit default swap market 
and further raises uncertainty to firms and thus to stock market investors. Consequently, 
investors will demand higher risk premium in order to invest in stocks of companies that are 
heavily exposed to bank lending. Alternatively, the uncertainty surrounding future credit 
rating of sovereign bonds may exasperate expected firm value volatility. This hypothesis is 
supported by Calice and Ioannidis (2012) who document that the volatility of a bank‟s equity 
value is substantially higher when the CDS market is in a volatile regime. 
 
2.4 The Risk Premium Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 4.1. Positive changes in the CDS spreads are followed by negative changes in the 
EUROSTOXX stock index. 
An increase in both BCDS and SCDS spreads signals economic hardship similar to 
Grammatikos and Vermeulen (2012). When BCDS spread increases, banks‟ bonds lose value 
and their yields increase to reflect higher cost of capital. As a result, future expected bank 
cash flows are discounted with a higher discount rate, while simultaneously the stock price 
decreases, as investors demand higher risk premium to compensate for the increased riskiness 
of the bank. Higher cost of capital is then transmitted to non-financial companies that rely on 
bank lending to finance their investment projects. With higher cost of capital, some 
investment projects become unprofitable and thus are discarded by the company. This places 
a constraint on the company‟s growth prospects, justifying a stock price decrease. Overall, an 
increase in the BCDS spread is followed by a decrease in the EUROSTOXX stock index. 
Similar to Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Sgherri and Zoli (2009) – who underline the 
importance of credit risk in the pricing of equities – Hypothesis 4.1 assumes that investors 
become increasingly concerned about the fiscal implications of the global financial crisis 
driving SCDS spread higher. Consistent with this hypothesis, Calice and Ioannidis (2012) 
find that bank returns of large complex financial institutions respond negatively to a positive 
shock to CDS spreads. 
Hypothesis 4.2. When the CDS market enters a more volatile regime, the magnitude of the 
response of the EUROSTOXX stock index is greater than in a less volatile regime. 
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In accordance with Hypothesis 4.2, Norden and Weber (2004) find that (i) the CDS 
market is more sensitive to the stock market than the bond market; and (ii) the magnitude of 
this sensitivity is negatively related to a firm‟s average credit quality. Furthermore, 
downgrades of sovereign bonds can also manifest cross-security contagion effects on stock 
market returns during financial crises (see also Kaminsky and Schmukler 2002).  Moreover, 
these downgrades trigger contagion effects on bank stock returns for those banks that 
investors expect to receive large government support (Correa et al. 2014). 
 
3. The Methodology 
In Section 3.1, we outline the model that is used in our empirical analysis. In Section 3.2, we 
describe the estimation method. In Section 3.3, we describe the impulse response functions. 
3.1 The Model 
We employ a Markov-Switching Bayesian Vector Autoregression (MSBVAR) model 
to study the regime-varying relation between BCDS and SCDS spreads. The MSBVAR 
model can be specified as 
                                                ,   (1) 
where    is an N-dimensional vector of dependent variables,     is an N-dimensional vector 
of constants in regime          ,    is a K-dimensional vector of exogenous variables,       
and     are (N x N) and (K x N) matrices of coefficients in regime   , respectively, and    is 
an N-dimensional vector of normally distributed structural disturbances uncorrelated at all 
leads and lags, where          . The variance of each structural disturbance is normalized 
to unity. We assume that all parameters may switch among   regimes. The reduced-form 
disturbances are the structural disturbances pre-multiplied by a regime-dependent matrix    . 
Consequently, the variance and covariance matrix of       is also regime-dependent, as 
indicated in the following equation: 
       (     )                          (2) 
The regime    is assumed to follow a hidden S-state Markov-chain. The probability of being 
in regime   conditional on the current regime   is assumed constant. The conditional 
probabilities that span the   regimes are given by the following probability transition matrix 
 : 
  (
       
   
       
),         (3) 
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Where      (           ) and ∑    
 
      for all         . 
For        , denote    *       +. More compactly, Equation (1) can be written as 
 (               )   (    )         (4) 
Where  (     )  refers to the normal probability distribution function with mean    and 
covariance matrix    in regime  . The overall log-likelihood function     (       ) can be 
obtained by 
    (         )  ∑     (            )
 
   ,       (5) 
where 
 (            )  ∑  (                )
 
    (                 )   (6) 
where is  (                 )  is the probability density function of    conditional to 
regime  , and  
 (                )  ∑  (           ) (                  )
 
        
.  (7) 
 
3.2 The Estimation Method 
The optimization of Equation (5) may be performed by means of a suitable extension 
of an expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm described in Hamilton (1994, Chapter 22) 
and Krolzig (1997) or by means of a Bayesian estimation algorithm (see also Waggoner and 
Zha 2003, Sims and Zha 2004, Sims and Zha 2006, Sims et al. 2008, inter alia). In this 
research, we use a Bayesian inference based on a Gibbs sampler that belongs to the Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) family of algorithms. The Gibbs sampler is a recursive Monte 
Carlo simulation method that requires only knowledge of the full conditional posterior 
density of the parameters of interest. An advantage of a Bayesian estimator is that it takes 
into account the whole distribution available from Bayesian sampling, whereas an EM 
algorithm can only return a single point from the distribution. Thus, the Gibbs sampler can be 
viewed as a stochastic version of the EM algorithm
8
.  
 
3.3 The Generalized Impulse Response Functions 
The Choleski decomposition is typically used in the literature to orthogonalize the 
reduced-form variance and covariance matrix    given in Equation (2).
9
 Because this 
approach is not invariant to the ordering of the endogenous variables in the VAR, Pesaran 
                                                          
8
 A detailed description of the Gibbs sampler is available in Appendix B.  
9
 The Choleski decomposition provides an indirect estimate of the lower triangular matrix   . Underlying the 
triangular factorization is the identification scheme proposed by Sims (1980), who suggests obtaining a unique 
triangular factorization of the residuals of a reduced-form VAR model by imposing a specific ordering of the 
endogenous variables of the VAR model. 
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and Shin (1998) propose an alternative approach that does not have this shortcoming, based 
on the so-called generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs). Pesaran and Shin (1998) 
show that for a non-diagonal variance and covariance matrix, the orthogonalized and the 
generalized impulse responses coincide only in the case of the impulse responses of the 
random disturbances to the first equation of the VAR. Against this background, we use the 
generalized impulse response analysis. 
The contemporaneous and lagged response of the endogenous variable can be 
measured by means of the regime-dependent GIRFs. In practice, vectors of the regime-
dependent impulse-responses can be derived by combining the parameter estimates of the 
unrestricted MSBVAR with the estimate of the regime-dependent variance and covariance 
matrix   . Let‟s first assume that in period 0, a shock hits the     endogenous variable. Then, 
the contemporaneous response vector measures the impact effect of the     random 
disturbance on the endogenous variables in period 0. A one standard deviation shock to the 
    endogenous variable can be denoted as a vector of zeros except for the nth element, 
which is unity, i.e.,    (             ). Pre-multiplying this vector by the estimate of the 
regime-dependent variance and covariance matrix  ̂  yields the contemporaneous response 
vector. A one-step-ahead response vector can be obtained by solving forward for the 
endogenous variables in Equation (1). It measures the impact effect of the     random 
disturbance (that occurred in period 0) on the endogenous variables in period 1. Analytically, 
the contemporaneous and  -step-ahead response vectors are given in Equations (8) and (9), 
respectively:   
 ̂           
   ⁄  ̂                         (8) 
 ̂           
   ⁄ ∑    
      ̂   
   *   +
   ,                       (9) 
It should be noted that Equations (8) and (9) depict net GIRFs, i.e., they assume that 
there are no further random disturbances in subsequent periods. However, because the BCDS 
and the SCDS spreads, the VSTOXX volatility index and the EUROSTOXX stock market 
index feature a slowly moving component and thus follow a high memory process, which is 
likely to be non-stationary, we transform the endogenous variables in first differences. To 
measure the responses of the endogenous variables in levels, accumulated GIRFs are utilized, 
which can be obtained by adding up net GIRFs. It is evident that the contemporaneous 
accumulated response vector can be still measured by Equation (8). The  -step-ahead 
accumulated response vector is given by Equation (10): 
 ̃      ∑  ̂     
 
   ,                                              (10) 
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The long-run response accumulated response is obtain as  ̃           ̃      . Then, the 
long-run differential effect of     random disturbance on    endogenous variable in regime  
    relative to regime   is given by 
  ̃     
   ̃     
   ̃   
         ̃       
         ̃     
                                                (11) 
Equation (11) allows testing if the long-run impulse response of     endogenous 
variable to     random disturbance is significantly different across regimes   through  . An 
advantage of focusing on the long-run GIRF is that its standard error becomes irrelevant, and 
statistical inference relies merely upon the value of the GIRF, rather than on the ratio of its 
value to the standard error, which driven by an arbitrarily chosen number of periods after the 
shock. Building upon the hypotheses outlined in Section 2, the magnitude of the impulse-
response is greater in a more volatile regime.
10
 Therefore, we have: 
      ̃     
    against       ̃     
                    (12) 
 
4. Data 
In the empirical analysis, we use daily data on banks‟ (iTraxx Senior Financials) and 
sovereign (iTraxx Sovereign Western Europe) CDS spreads, EUROSTOXX stock market 
index and VSTOXX volatility index, and the fixed-for-floating euro interest rate swaps for 
maturities ranging from 1 to 30 years. The data are retrieved from Thomson Datastream. The 
sample period spans 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013, containing a total of 2154 daily observations. 
Most iTraxx CDS indices are traded for maturities of 3, 5, 7 and 10 years, with the 5 year 
maturity being the most liquid, and thus employed in this study. The iTraxx CDS indices are 
spread based indices and are quoted in the market in spread terms. The spread equates to an 
upfront price given the fixed deal spread (coupon) for the swaps. This price is essentially the 
upfront value of entering into a CDS index contract. In addition, we use the EUROSTOXX 
stock market index and the VSTOXX volatility index. Credit spreads (Fama and French 
1989), default probabilities and recovery rates (Altman et al. 2005, Hackbarth et al. 2006, 
Pesaran et al. 2006), and investors‟ risk aversion (Annaert et al. 2013) tend to vary over the 
business cycle. Therefore, the business cycle should affect credit spreads through two 
channels: (i) the business-cycle vulnerability of default risk and (ii) time-varying investors‟ 
risk aversion that is incorporated in the risk premium of investment (Collin-Dufresne et al. 
                                                          
10
 It should be nevertheless noted that MCMC standard errors, estimated by means of the Gibbs sampler, make it 
possible to test the null hypothesis in Equation (12) at the 95% confidence level by graphically inspecting the 
position of the GIRF and the 2-standard error confidence bands. The estimated GIRF are presented and analysed 
in Section 5.2. 
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2001). We follow Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Annaert et al. (2013) by including a 
market wide stock index return as a control variable for the business climate. The 
EUROSTOXX stock index is a broad index that represents large, mid and small capitalisation 
companies of 12 euro zone countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.  
The VSTOXX volatility index is based on EUROSTOXX real-time option prices and 
is designed to reflect the market expectations from near-term up to long-term volatility. It is 
thought to represent market uncertainty of the economic prospects (Annaert et al. 2013) and 
time-varying investors‟ risk aversion (Pan and Singleton 2008). Alternatively, it may also 
represent market strains that limit capital mobility across different market segments and thus 
sustain temporarily high risk premia (Annaert et al. 2013). Following Alexander and Kaeck 
(2008) and Annaert et al. (2013), we use the VSTOXX volatility index to measure market-
wide volatility expectations. 
Finally, fixed-for-floating euro interest rate swaps capture the risk free interest rate 
and expectations of the future risk free interest rate. Higher risk free interest rate will 
incentivize investors to invest in risk free assets, thereby decreasing the share of risky assets 
in their portfolio and decreasing the credit risk. In the risk neutral world, the risk free interest 
rate constitutes the drift (Merton 1974). Hence, an increase in the risk free interest rate drives 
up the risk neutral drift and decreases the probability of default. Following Alexander and 
Kaeck (2008), we calculate the first and second principal components on the fixed-for-
floating euro interest rate swaps for maturities ranging from 1 to 30 years. The first principal 
component captures the level of the risk-free interest rate, whereas the second component 
(“slope”) represents expectations of future movements in the risk free interest rate.11    
– Please Insert Table 1 about here – 
Panel A (Panel B) of Table 1 summarises descriptive statistics of the variables in 
levels (in first differences). Over the sample period, the mean of the BCDS spread (106.87 
basis points) is greater than the mean of the SCDS spread (91.79 basis points) reflecting a 
greater credit default risk of the European banking sector. BCDS also is more volatile than 
SCDS, as witnessed by the range of variation of the data (the difference between the 
minimum and maximum values) and by the standard deviation. BCDS deviates from the 
                                                          
11
 Moreover, the slope of the term structure conveys valuable information about the business cycle stance 
(Estrella and Mishkin 1997). Specifically, a high slope anticipates an increase in future economic activity (Fama 
1984, Estrella and Hardouvelis 1991). It should also be noted that the use of the level and slope interest-rate 
swaps is consistent with the literature advocating that co-movement between banks‟ and sovereign issuers‟ CDS 
premia may be driven by a common set of unobserved factors, probably reflecting changing macroeconomic 
fundamentals (Ejsing and Lemke 2011, Acharya et al. 2013). 
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mean on average by 81.99 basis points, whereas SCDS deviates by only 49.58 basis points. 
The two measures of credit default risk are also positively skewed and leptokurtic. The 
resulting distributions are non-normal, since the normality is rejected by the Jarque-Bera test 
statistic. The change in the VSTOXX volatility index has a positive mean, suggesting that 
expectations of stock market volatility increase over the sample period. It experienced 
significant fluctuations over the sample period, as indicates the range of variation in the 
standard deviation. The latter indicates that the change in the VSTOXX volatility index 
deviates from the mean on average by 1.93 index points. The change in the volatility index is 
also positively skewed and highly leptokurtic resulting in a non-normal distribution of values. 
Daily percentage stock returns were negative during the sample period (-0.0032% in daily 
percentage). Stock returns were highly volatile, as suggests the range of variation and the 
standard deviation. The latter reveals that stock returns deviate from the mean on average by 
1.42%. Consistent with empirical evidence on skewness and kurtosis, returns are negatively 
skewed and leptokurtic, implying that big negative events in the European stock market are 
more likely than big positive events and that the density of returns is greater the closer returns 
are to the sample median. Therefore, the resulting distribution of returns is non-normal. The 
fixed-for-floating interest rate swaps have positive means ranging from 2.25% (1-year 
maturity) to 3.76% (20-year maturity). Thus, longer maturity interest rate swaps tend to have 
a higher rate than shorter maturity interest rate swaps. The converse is true for the range of 
variation and the standard deviation. Longer maturity interest rate swaps tend to be less 
volatile. Shorter maturity (up to 4 years) swaps are positively skewed, whereas longer 
maturity swaps are negatively skewed. Interest rate swaps are leptokurtic and non-normally 
distributed for all maturities. 
– Please Insert Table 2 about here – 
Table 2 summarizes results for the unit root tests. We use four different unit root tests 
– the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) 
test, the Phillips-Perron (PP) test and the Zivot-Andrews (ZA) test – to test for a unit root in 
the data.
12
In particular, Table 2 provides overwhelming evidence that the EUROSTOXX 
stock index, SCDS spread and interest rate swaps for maturities higher than 2 years have a 
unit root. The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected for the BCDS spread and SLOPE if the 
                                                          
12
 The choice of the tests is based on the fact that (i) the ADF and PP tests are classical parametric and semi-
parametric unit root tests, respectively; (ii) the ADF, PP and ZA tests hypothesize a unit root as a null 
hypothesis, whereas the KPSS test hypothesizes no unit root as a null hypothesis and hence aims at 
complementing the classical unit root tests; and (iii) unlike the other three tests, the ZA tests allows for the 
possibility of a break in the series that may contaminate the power of the classical unit root tests. 
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ZA test is used. Further, the VSTOXX volatility index is identified as difference-stationary 
only if the KPSS test is used. In general, the results of the unit root tests support the use of 
variables in first differences in the MSBVAR models. Because interest rate swaps for most 
maturities have a unit root, we run a principal component analysis on the series in first 
differences. 
– Please Insert Table 3 about here – 
Table 3 summarizes the coefficients of pairwise correlations among the endogenous 
and exogenous variables in first differences. Specifically, the BCDS and SCDS spreads are 
positively correlated with the VSTOXX volatility index. The EUROSTOXX volatility index 
is negatively correlated with the other endogenous variables. With regard to the correlations 
between endogenous and exogenous variables, the BCDS and SCDS spreads, and the 
VSTOXX volatility index (EUROSTOXX stock index) exhibit a moderate negative (positive) 
association with interest rate swaps of different maturities. 
 
5. Empirical Findings 
In Section 5.1, we describe the regimes identified by means of the MSBVAR model. 
In Section 5.2, we analyze the estimated effects of endogenous variables by means of impulse 
response functions. In Section 5.3, we study the estimated effects of exogenous variables. In 
Section 5.4, we report robustness checks. 
 
5.1 Markov Regimes 
Key to the MSBVAR model is the identification of switching regimes, governed by a 
stochastic, unobserved regime variable   . The regimes are associated with different 
conditional distributions of the BCDS and the SCDS spreads, the change in the VSTOXX 
volatility index and returns on the EUROSTOXX stock market index driven by   . The 
regime-dependent parameter matrix    is estimated using the Gibbs sampler, and the 
probability of each regime (and thus the length of each regime) is endogenously determined. 
However, the number of regimes   is based on the notion that the dynamic relation between 
the BCDS and SCDS spreads may be (i) different before and after the subprime-mortgage 
crisis period (i.e., July 2007), and (ii) different in periods clustered around the various credit 
events after the subprime mortgage crisis – such as the contagious effects of the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers – and in periods where those contagious effects deteriorated. Therefore, a 
parsimonious model that assumes two regimes may fail to distinguish between periods 
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wherein bond investments are highly risky – characterized by uncertainty and volatility – and 
periods where the riskiness of bond investments is perceived as less critical
13
. Thus, assuming 
two regimes only, it is possible to omit a portion of relevant information from our empirical 
analysis and hence the model will become overly restrictive.  
Moreover, a model with 2 regimes is likely to lead to misspecification issues when the 
true number of regimes is in fact higher. Furthermore, our choice for the number of Markov 
regimes is further supported by Chib‟s (1995) method and the method of bridge sampling, 
proposed by Meng and Wong (1996) and extended by Frühwirth-Schnatter (2004). We 
employ 5000 MCMC draws from a posterior density to compute the marginal log-likelihood 
values that used to select among various models differing in the number of regimes of the 
hidden latent variable. Results of Chib‟s (1995) and Meng and Wong (1996) methods for four 
Markov regimes for the four dependent variables are summarized in Table 4. From this table, 
we observe that the marginal log-likelihood values increase substantially from one to three 
regimes but then decrease in regime four for all dependent variables. Both Chib‟s and the 
bridge-sampling methods suggest that a model with three Markov regimes fits the data best.
14
  
– Please Insert Table 4 about here – 
We use a MSBVAR model of order 1 to estimate the relation between the BCDS and SCDS 
spreads, returns on the EUROSTOXX stock index and the change in the VSTOXX volatility 
index. The vector of exogenous variables comprises the first (“level”) and second (“slope”) 
principal components on the fixed-for-floating Euro interest rate swaps for different 
maturities (from 1 year to 30 years). All parameters are allowed to change across the regimes. 
The variance and covariance matrix is also regime-dependent. The smooth-estimated regime 
probabilities are presented in red Panels A – C of Figure 2 (bottom plot).  
– Please Insert Figure 2 about here – 
A regime is defined as a region (or polygon) with the highest smoothed probability, i.e. 
    
          (            )                  (13) 
The estimation results reported in Figure 2 suggest that regime 1 prevails from the 
beginning of the sample (March 2005) till July 2007 that marks the beginning of the U.S. 
                                                          
13
 The choice of the number of regimes has been fiercely debated in the literature. A standard approach is to use 
2 regimes (e.g., high and low volatility regimes in financial markets), based on economic rather than on 
statistical principle. However, it is not uncommon to rely upon a more complex three-regime MSBVAR. An 
example is Artis et al. (2004) who identify three regimes (recessions, moderate-growth periods and high-growth 
periods) in the post-war US business cycle. 
14
 While our main analysis is based on a MSBVAR that assumes the presence of three regimes, we also estimate 
a MSBVAR with two regimes.The results of the 2-regime MSBVAR model are not presented but are briefly 
discussed in Section 5.5.  
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subprime mortgage crisis. Since the BCDS and SCDS spreads feature a slowly moving 
component with a negative tendency, regime 1 can be viewed as a low volatility regime. In 
July 2007, the CDS market switches from regime 1 to regime 2. This regime can be viewed 
as a collection of sub-periods where the BCDS and SCDS spreads are more volatile than in 
regime 1, but less abrupt than in regime 3. Regime 2 dominates the rest of the sample period 
that starts in July 2007 and is only occasionally interrupted by regime 3, when the BCDS and 
SCDS spreads depict an accelerated increase and decrease with a turning point in the middle 
of the regime. Thus, regimes 2 and 3 can be denoted as intermediate volatility and high 
volatility regimes, respectively. 
 
5.2 Endogenous Variables 
The main findings are summarized by means of the GIRF (Pesaran and Shin 1998). 
The GIRFs for the four shocks are depicted in Panels A – D of Figure 3. Panel A (B, C, D) 
presents the response of the four endogenous variables to a shock to the BCDS spread (SCDS 
spread, return on the EUROSTOXX stock index, change in the VSTOXX volatility index) in 
the three regimes. The GIRFs are analyzed in terms of the long-run differential pairwise 
effects across the three regimes, outlined in Section 3.3. 
Panel A suggests that an unexpected change in the BCDS spread has a positive effect 
on the BCDS and the SCDS spreads, and the VSTOXX volatility index. On the other hand, it 
exerts a negative effect on the EUROSTOXX stock index. 
– Please Insert Figure 3 Panel A about here – 
A rise in BCDS spread signals an increase in credit risk in the banking sector. As euro 
area governments extend guarantees to their national banking sectors, a positive effect on the 
SCDS spread is expected. Indeed, as the credit risk in the euro area banking sector increases, 
government liability increases too. In line with our expectations, the impulse response is 
clearly positive and significant, and it substantially varies across the regimes. More precisely, 
in the low volatility regime the response is smallest in magnitude, whereas in the high-
volatility regime the response has the largest magnitude. Consistent with Alter and Schüler 
(2012, Hypothesis 2(a)), following government interventions, changes in the banking sector‟s 
credit risk affect the sovereign credit risk more strongly than before, since governments take 
over liabilities of the banking sector. Gerlach et al. (2010) argue that sovereign credit risk 
may be affected by the banking sector by two channels. The first channel refers to the 
probability that the government can recapitalize banks with public money if they run into 
financial difficulties. The second channel, identified by Adrian and Shin (2009), underscores 
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the importance of financial intermediaries‟ balance sheet adjustments for aggregate liquidity 
and financial stability for the government‟s fiscal position, public revenue and spending.  
Second, a change in BCDS spread also causes a positive and permanent effect on the 
level of the BCDS spread. Although the autoregressive component in the equation for BCDS 
spread is not justified on theoretical grounds, it captures the share of variation in the change 
of BCDS spread that is not explained by the predetermined and exogenous variables in the 
VAR.
15
 Third, the impulse response of the VSTOXX volatility index is positive, and it 
increases with positive changes in the banking sector‟s credit risk. 16  This allows us to 
consider the VSTOXX volatility index as a proxy to capture spikes in volatility. Similar to 
Alexander and Kaeck (2008), our results imply that unobservable firm‟s asset volatility can 
be approximated and captured by the VSTOXX volatility index. Indeed, an increase in BCDS 
spread generates greater uncertainty and volatility spikes in the stock market, while also it 
distresses investments. Consequently, stock market investors may decide to rebalance their 
portfolios of assets by increasing exposure to stocks of non-financial companies that are less 
affected by increasing banks‟ credit risk. 
Fourth, the impulse response of the EUROSTOXX stock index is negative and 
significant. Indeed, as an increase in BCDS spread generates greater uncertainty to firms, the 
risk premium required by stock market investors increases. Thus, investors require lower 
valuations in order to invest in portfolio of stocks. Therefore, the impulse response of the 
EUROSTOXX stock index has the expected negative sign. The impulse response also has a 
regime-dependent pattern, wherein the response in the high volatility regime is greater than 
the response in the low and intermediate volatility regimes. This finding implies that 
deterioration in credit risk conditions and an increase in uncertainty, render stock market 
investors more vulnerable to news about the banking sector‟s credit standards. 
To sum up, Panel A of Figure 3 is supportive of Hypotheses 1, 3 and 4. An 
unanticipated change in BCDS spread has a direct effect on BCDS and SCDS spreads and the 
VSTOXX volatility index, and it has an inverse effect on the EUROSTOXX stock index. 
Crucially, an unanticipated change in BCDS spread has always a stronger effect in a more 
volatile than in a less volatile regime. 
                                                          
15
 The autoregressive component is empirically motivated by Byström (2005, 2006), who finds that iTraxx 
Europe indices feature a significant autocorrelation in their spread. 
16
 The impulse response is significant in the intermediate and high volatility regimes. The VSTOXX volatility 
index is based on the current value of stock options. It can be thought of as a forward-looking measure of stock 
market volatility and measures uncertainty of stock market investments. 
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Panel B of Figure 3 suggests that an unanticipated change in the SCDS spread has a 
positive effect on BCDS and SCDS spreads, and the VSTOXX volatility index. More 
concretely, an increase in the spread triggers negative movements on the EUROSTOXX 
stock index whilst also, an increase in SCDS spread signals greater perceived risk of 
sovereign bonds. The impulse response of BCDS spread is positive, significant and regime 
dependent. The effect of a change in SCDS spread is relatively smaller in the low volatility 
regime, but its magnitude grows in the intermediate volatility regime. Finally, the magnitude 
of the effect amplifies in the high volatility regime, which mainly clusters in the period 
spanning from October 2008 – March 2009. Specifically, the period around October 2008 is 
marked by various important credit events in the euro area that triggered the introduction of 
government rescue packages. Following government interventions in 2008, BCDS spread 
initially decreased but then they recovered, as the mechanism used to transfer credit risk from 
the banking sector to sovereign issuers was constrained by the credibility of government 
contingent liabilities to the banking sector. This result is supported by Alter and Schüler 
(2012) who argue that “due to changes in the composition of both banks‟ and sovereign 
balance sheets… the government CDS spreads have increased importance in the price 
discovery mechanism of the banks‟ CDS series”. 
– Please Insert Figure 3 Panel B about here – 
Second, we corroborate the works of Byström (2005, 2006) by identifying that an 
unanticipated change in the SCDS spread has a positive and permanent effect on the level of 
SCDS spread. The sign and significance of the impulse response function of SCDS spread 
can be justified on empirical grounds, since spread changes feature a positive and significant 
autocorrelation. The impulse response is smaller in magnitude in a lower than in a higher 
volatility regime. 
Third, the impulse response of the VSTOXX volatility index is positive and 
significant, and it shows a regime-dependent pattern. An increase in SCDS spread triggers an 
increase in the economic risk. Particularly, the euro area governments‟ fiscal position is 
weakened by the introduction of large-scale financial rescue packages for their national 
banking sectors. This development depresses the governments‟ fiscal position and causes a 
gap between public spending and revenues (Acharya et al. 2013). As a result, uncertainty 
among stock market investors soared. Fourth, the impulse response of returns on the 
EUROSTOXX stock index is negative and significant, while also it varies across the three 
regimes. This result is intuitively in line with Grammatikos and Vermeulen (2012), who find 
that euro area returns on non-financial and financial companies become increasingly 
20 
 
(negatively) dependent upon the Greek SCDS spread in the period following the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers. A rise in sovereign debt due to the countercyclical fiscal policy measures, 
is perceived by stock market investors as a burden on economic growth prospects. Slower 
economic growth and expectations for an increase in tax rates undermine corporate profits 
and lead to a decrease in stock market returns. To summarize, Panel B of Figure 3 confirms 
and supports Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4. An unanticipated change in SCDS spread has a direct 
effect on BCDS and SCDS spreads and the VSTOXX volatility index, and an inverse effect 
on the EUROSTOXX stock index. An unanticipated change in the SCDS spread has always a 
stronger effect in a more volatile than in a less volatile regime. 
Panel C of Figure 3 suggests that an unanticipated change in the VSTOXX volatility 
index has a positive effect on BCDS and SCDS spreads, and the VSTOXX volatility index. 
On the contrary, it exerts a negative effect on the EUROSTOXX stock index. We find that an 
increase in the VSTOXX volatility index leads to a significant increase in BCDS and SCDS 
spreads. This effect is always larger in magnitude in a higher volatility regime. This result is 
in line with Alexander and Kaeck (2008), who find that higher firm value volatility is more 
likely to hit a default barrier than lower firm value volatility. Second, we also document that 
an unanticipated change in the VSTOXX volatility index triggers a direct permanent change 
in the index level. This effect is larger in magnitude in a higher volatility regime. Third, as 
expected, higher firm value volatility feeds into higher risk premium that is required by stock 
market investors. In a higher volatility regime this effect is larger in magnitude, depressing 
further stock market returns. This explains a negative impulse response of the EUROSTOXX 
stock index. 
– Please Insert Figure 3 Panel C about here – 
Panel D of Figure 3 indicates that an unanticipated change in the EUROSTOXX stock 
index has a negative effect on BCDS and SCDS spreads, and the VSTOXX volatility index. 
In particular, we observe that when a firm‟s value depreciates, the probability of default will 
increase as the firm may not be able to honor its credit commitments. On the one hand, this 
increases firm‟s value volatility, which is represented by a change in the VSTOXX volatility 
index. On the other hand, the loan default rates increase in the economy as the leveraged firm 
may not be able to repay its loans. This impairs the performance of banks and spills over to 
the CDS market. As a result, when the decrease in firm‟s value becomes widespread, BCDS 
and SCDS spreads increase. These results are consonant to some extent with Alexander and 
Kaeck (2008) who document that a change in a firm‟s value has an inverse effect on CDS 
spreads. 
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– Please Insert Figure 3 Panel D about here – 
 
5.3 Exogenous Variables 
The impulse-response functions can be used to evaluate the effects of shocks to 
endogenous variables only. However, they do not capture the effects of the first and second 
principal components that are used as exogenous variables in our research. To evaluate the 
above theoretical underpinnings, the estimated effects of the first and second principal 
components in Panel A of Table 5 can be analyzed.  
– Please Insert Table 5 about here – 
The first (second) principal component can be interpreted as the “level” (“slope”) of a 
risk-free interest rate. An increase in the risk-free interest rate renders risk-free assets (e.g. 
government bonds) more attractive and, therefore, banks will rebalance their portfolios of 
assets selling off risky investments and buying safer government bonds. This finding agrees 
with Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Alexander and Kaeck (2008) and Chan and Marsden 
(2014). As a result, BCDS spread will decrease, indicating a negative association between the 
first principal component and BCDS spread. Because the scenario involving government 
interventions in healthy banks can be ruled out, we would also expect a negative association 
between SCDS spread and the first principal component.  
Regarding the second principal component, higher term structure incentivizes banks 
to invest in longer-term government securities and, hence, decreases BCDS and SCDS 
spreads. In this respect, our results endorse Alexander and Kaeck (2008). The first principal 
component is negative and significant implying that changes in interest rates influence 
inversely BCDS and SCDS spreads. Furthermore, the second principal component should 
have a negative association with BCDS and SCDS spreads but there is no significant 
evidence to support this assertion. 
 
5.4 Robustness Checks 
Our main findings are supported by several robustness checks. First, following 
Alexander and Kaeck (2008), we replace the first and the second principal components with 
the 5-year interest rate swap (“LEVEL”) and difference between 10 and 2 year interest rate 
swaps (“SLOPE”), respectively. Panel D of Table 5 indicates that the effects of the 
alternative measures of interest rate level and slope are qualitatively similar to the effects of 
the first and second principal components. In particular, we find that the 5-year interest rate 
swap has in general a negative and significant effect on BCDS and SCDS spreads. Our results 
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also suggest that the alternative measure of slope in general does not appear to influence 
significantly the BCDS and SCDS spreads.
17
 
Second, we replace the EUROSTOXX stock index by the EUROSTOXX 50 index in 
our MSBVAR model. The EUROSTOXX 50 is Europe‟s leading Blue-Chip index that 
represents 50 leading super-sector stocks in the euro area. In analogy with our results 
obtained using a broader EUROSTOXX stock index, the regime-dependent GIRFs indicate 
that the an unexpected change in the BCDS, SCDS spreads and in the VSTOXX volatility 
index has always a negative effect on the EUROSTOXX 50 stock index. Furthermore, the 
response of the EUROSTOXX 50 stock index is always greater in magnitude in a more 
volatile regime. 
Third, motivated by Correa et al. (2014) and Gennaioli et al. (2014), who investigate 
the effects of sovereign defaults on bank credit and bank stock returns, we substitute the 
EUROSTOXX stock index with the EUROSTOXX BANKS index comprising 30 largest 
banking sector‟s stocks. This exercise corroborates the results obtained using broader and 
more diversified stock market indices in the euro area. 
Fourth, we estimate a MSBVAR model of order 4 (MSBVAR(4)). This lag length is 
selected by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) on a linear VAR. The results obtained 
using the MSBVAR(4) are qualitatively similar to the MSBVAR(1). Fifth, we estimate the 
MSBVAR model with 2 regimes. This model implies that a low volatility regime (regime 1) 
dominated in the sample sub-period before July 2007, and a high volatility regime (regime 2) 
dominated thereafter. The results obtained from this model are qualitatively similar to the 
results obtained using the MSBVAR model with 3 regimes. The 2-regime MSBVAR shows 
that the effects of shocks to the credit default swap market and the stock market are always 
greater (in absolute value) in the high volatility regime than in the low volatility regime. This 
finding is further corroborated by the 2-regime MSBVAR estimated on weekly data. 
Fifth, since the VSTOXX volatility index shows some tendency to revert to the mean 
we also estimate a 3-regime VAR, with the VSTOXX volatility index measured in levels. 
The effects of shocks to the BCDS and SCDS spreads, EUROSTOXX stock index and 
VSTOXX volatility index resemble those reported in Figure 3 and described in Section 5.2. A 
shock to the VSTOXX volatility index has a positive effect on the BCDS and SCDS spreads, 
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 Due to the presence of a unit root, the 5-year interest rate swap is used in first differences. The difference 
between the 10-year and 2-year interest rate swaps is stationary (features a unit root) according to the Zivot-
Andrews (ADF, KPSS and PP) test. In Panel D of Table 5, the slope is measured in levels. As a robustness 
check, we also estimated our MSBVAR models with a slope measured in first differences. Results are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained using the measures of level and slope. The results using the measure of 
slope in first differences are not reported, but are available from the authors upon request. 
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the VSTOXX volatility index, and it has a negative effect on the EUROSTOXX stock market 
index. Moreover, this effect is greater in a more volatile regime. The detailed results obtained 
for our second through sixth robustness checks are not reported but are available from the 
authors upon request. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study examines the regime-dependent interdependence between euro area banks‟ 
and sovereign credit default swap (BCDS and SCDS, respectively) spreads, stock and credit 
markets via using a state-of-art MSBVAR model. The model sheds light on a significant 
regime-dependent interdependence between these variables. Specifically, our results indicate 
that government interventions in the banking sector metastasize and lead to credit risk 
transfer from the banking to the public sector. Furthermore, the results assert the feedback 
hypothesis, while also imply that the expectation of support from national governments 
allows banks to be more leveraged, making them more vulnerable to sovereign defaults. 
Therefore, this study provides novel evidence that large-scale rescue packages do not 
necessarily stabilize the banking sector, as witnessed by rising BCDS spreads. The increase 
in BCDS spreads and the subsequent decision of euro area governments to bail out troubled 
banks triggered an unprecedented increase in SCDS spreads. This decision resulted in greater 
fiscal deterioration of euro area countries and thus in greater sovereign credit risk (IMF 
2013). 
We also investigate the regime-dependent relation between the euro area credit and 
stock markets. According to Sandleris (2014), such interconnectedness builds upon two 
intertwined channels through which a sovereign default affects stock markets. First, a 
sovereign default can trigger a contraction in the credit market (credit channel). Moreover, in 
the event of a sovereign default, a decrease in investments affects negatively firms‟ net worth 
and makes collateral constraints more stringent (investment channel). The interaction and 
synchronicity between these two channels makes it important to incorporate stock market 
variables in our study. In response to the issues raised in the introduction, the empirical 
results provide strong evidence that an unexpected positive change to BCDS and SCDS 
spreads causes an increase in investors‟ expectations of stock market volatility, as measured 
by the change in the VSTOXX volatility index, and advances to a decrease in the 
EUROSTOXX stock index. In particular, we document a significant rise in co-movement in 
the post-bailout period between BCDS and SCDS and the VSTOXX volatility index. These 
findings are supported by the empirical evidence on the effects of changes in sovereign credit 
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ratings on financial instability (Kaminsky and Schmukler 2002) and stock market returns 
(Brooks et al. 2004, Correa et al. 2014).
18
 Moreover, we find that the effects of unexpected 
changes to BCDS and SCDS spreads on the VSTOXX volatility index and on the 
EUROSTOXX stock index are more pronounced and stronger in a more volatile regime, 
reflecting an increased incidence of contagion across financial markets.
19
 Thus, our research 
provides also scope for hedging strategies for investments in the Euro Area CDS market. 
Indeed, stock market variables, such as the VSTOXX volatility index and the EUROSTOXX 
stock market index futures can be used to hedge against undesired developments in the BCDS 
and SCDS spreads.  
Furthermore, we complement the literature that studies the determinants of BCDS and 
SCDS spreads. Whereas most of this literature uses single-equation models to evaluate the 
determinants of CDS (Alexander and Kaeck 2008, Chan and Marsden 2014), our research is 
based on a multiple-equation model. More concretely, we use a state-of-art Markov-
Switching Bayesian Vector Autoregression (MSBVAR) model that (i) relaxes the assumption 
maintained in previous research that stock market variables are exogenous in determining 
CDS spreads, (ii) allows to compute regime-dependent impulse response functions, as in 
Erhmann et a. (2003) and (iii) uses a Gibbs sampler to estimate the MSBVAR, which can be 
thought of a stochastic version of the expectations maximization algorithm commonly used to 
estimate Markov-switching models.
20
 Our study extends previous research in terms of the 
data sample and the number of regimes. Specifically, Alexander and Kaeck (2008) use a 
Markov-switching model to identify two regimes, and their sample period spans three years 
of daily data, from 06/2004 through 06/2007. By contrast, we use daily data from 03/2005 to 
06/2013. Moreover, a low volatility regime, identified by our MSBVAR model, encompasses 
the entire sample period used in Alexander and Kaeck (2008). In addition, by means of 
smoothed regime probabilities, we also identify an intermediate volatility regime that started 
                                                          
18
 If bank bailouts contribute to instability of financial markets, and sovereign credit rating downgrades have a 
larger effect on bank equity returns for those banks that are more likely to receive support from their 
governments, then investors will be willing to buy bank equity only if its valuation is sufficiently low in periods 
marked by heightened volatility. Admittedly, changes in sovereign credit ratings can simultaneous influence 
both the CDS market and the stock market, thus generating a co-movement between SCDS spread, stock market 
returns and volatility. 
19
 The effects of unexpected changes to BCDS and SCDS spreads on the VSTOXX volatility index and on the 
EUROSTOXX stock index are more pronounced and stronger in a more volatile regime, reflecting an increased 
incidence of contagion across financial markets. Following Yuan (2005) and Jotikasthira et al. (2012), 
uninformed rational investors are not able to distinguish between selling based on liquidity shocks and selling 
based on fundamental shocks. Thus, when investors suffer a large loss, they are forced to liquidate their 
positions in other investments, triggering cross-market portfolio rebalancing. This finding complements Jorion 
and Zhang (2007) who examine contagion channels between CDS and stock markets. 
20
 The Gibbs sampler has been seldom used to estimate Markov-switching vector autoregression models. 
Hamilton and Owyang (2012) is an example. 
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in July 2007 (and coincided with the beginning of the subprime mortgage crisis in the United 
States), and a high volatility regime that prevailed in the aftermath of extensive government 
interventions in September 2008. 
We document that since July 2007, the CDS market switched from low risk (regime 
1) to mainly intermediate (regime 2) and occasionally to high risk regime (regime 3). The 
transition from low to higher volatility regimes after 2007 indicates that the euro area 
switched from a period of low sovereign credit risk to that of unprecedented risk 
disintegration, because the economic crisis affected disproportionally the „periphery‟ 
economies, compared to the „core‟ German economy. Second, an unanticipated increase in 
stock market volatility increases bank and sovereign CDS spreads. Third, a decline in the 
EUROSTOXX raises equity market volatility, sovereign and bank CDS spreads. Finally, we 
provide novel evidence that the effects accelerated during, mainly, intermediate (regime 2) 
and high risk regime (regime 3). Hence, our research extends Acharya et al. (2013) by 
documenting that the two-way effects between banking and sovereign credit risks are 
stronger in a more volatile regime.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Credit Default Swaps 
Credit default swaps (CDS) are derivative contracts that allow investors in an 
underlying debt instrument to protect themselves against a deterioration of credit quality and 
even a default on debt. As its name suggests, the payoff on a CDS depends on the default of a 
specific borrower, such as a government or a firm, or of a specific security, such as a bond. 
The value of this instrument is especially sensitive to the state of the overall economy. For 
instance, if the economy moves toward a recession, the likelihood of defaults increases and 
the expected payoff on credit default swaps will rise quickly. The credit default swap was 
pioneered by JP Morgan in 1994. 
In addition to the above, a CDS can be viewed as an insurance contract that provides 
protection against a specific default. CDSs are not traded on an exchange, however most 
CDSs are documented using standard forms drafted by the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA). CDS contracts provide protection against the default of a 
corporation, sovereign nation, mortgage payers, and other borrowers. The buyer of protection 
makes periodic payments, analogous to insurance premiums, at the CDS rate specified in the 
contract. If the named borrower defaults, the seller of protection must pay the difference 
between the principal amount covered by the CDS and the market value of the debt. For 
instance, when Lehman Brothers defaulted, its debt was worth about eight cents on the dollar, 
hence sellers of protection had to pay about ninety-two cents for each notional dollar of debt 
they had guaranteed. Following a credit event in a constituent of the index, the ISDA 
Determinations Committee votes to decide if a credit event has occurred for the entity and if 
an auction for the defaulted entity is to be held. If the outcome of this vote is positive, Markit 
publishes a new version of the index zero weighting the relevant entity i.e. the “reduced” 
index. Recovery rates for the examined indices are 40%. The benchmark Markit iTraxx 
Senior Financials index consists of 25 equally-weighted large and systemically important 
European banks. 
Although CDSs can be used as insurance against a default, the buyer of protection is not 
obliged or required to own the named borrower‟s debt or to be otherwise exposed to the 
borrower‟s default (i.e. “naked” position). After two counterparties agree on the terms of a 
CDS, they can “clear” the CDS by having the clearinghouse stand (e.g. the International 
Exchange Clear Europe unit) between them.  
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Appendix B. Bayesian Updating and Gibbs Sampling 
B.1 Bayesian Updating 
The probability  (                  ) in Equation (7) can be updated recursively. The 
updating procedure involves the following computation: 
 (            )  
 (               ) (                )
∑  (               )
 
    (                )
               (B1) 
Denoting  
      (                )       ,                (B2) 
and collecting      in vector    (                ), Equation (7) can be written as  
          
         
                     (B3) 
After a sufficient number of iterations a Markov chain reaches an ergodic distribution   ,  
where the expected regime is independent from the initial condition, and which satisfies  
                           (B4) 
 
B.2 Gibbs sampling 
According to the Bayes rule, the posterior distribution of   conditional on the data is 
 (      )   ( ) (     )                  (B5) 
The parameter matrix  is first partitioned into   blocks,  (          ). Because of 
the analytical complexity of the posterior density  (               ) , there is no 
analytical solution to  (               ) , nor it is possible to simulate from its 
distribution. To this end, Sims and Zha (2004) suggest using the Gibbs sampler to obtain the 
joint density  (                  ). We assume that the conditional posterior densities 
 (                  ) ,  (                  ) ,  (                  ) , … 
,  (                    ) are known. Then the Gibbs sampler starts from arbitrary values 
for ( )  .  
( )   
( )     
( )/ that may be determined randomly, and samples alternatively 
from the density of each parameter block, conditional on the values of the other parameter 
blocks sampled in the previous iteration and the data. Thus, the following steps compose the 
algorithm for simulating draws from the posterior distribution of   (Waggoner and Zha 
2003): 
1. Choose the arbitrary values ( )  .  
( )   
( )     
( )/. 
2. For             and given  
(   )  .  
(   )   
(   )     
(   )/ , obtain  ( )  
.  
( )   
( )     
( )/ by 
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2.1. simulating  
( )
 from the conditional density of   
( )   
(   )   
(   )     
(   )
, 
2.2. simulating  
( )
 from the conditional density of   
( )   
( )   
(   )     
(   )
, 
… 
2.H simulating  
( )
 from the conditional density of   
( )   
( )   
( )       
(   )
. 
3. Collect the sequence  
( )   
( )     
( )     
(     )   
(     )     
(     ) and keep only 
the last values    of the sequence. 
Step 3 concerns a choice of    and   . If the initial values  
( )   
( )     
( )
 are random but 
are not drawn from the target distribution, the first    draws (the so-called “burn-in” period) 
are discarded. This is because (i) the first    draws may not accurately represent the desired 
distribution and (ii) successive samples are not independent upon each other but rather form a 
Markov chain with some degree of correlation. By contrast, the second    draws can be 
regarded as draws from the true posterior joint density. We set         and         . 
 
B.3 Priors 
In the Gibbs sampler, we use the following priors. For the MSBVAR coefficients    ,     and 
    we use flat priors. As suggested by Chib (1996), the prior of the transition matrix   is 
drawn from a Dirichlet distribution. For the k
th
 column of P, pk, the prior density is given by 
 (  )   (         )   (         )      
           
     , where       for 
       . We use hierarchical priors for variance and covariance matrix. The regime-
invariant variance and covariance matrix is drawn from a Wishart distribution, 
   (0∑    (   )
   
      
1
  
 ∑    
 
      
) , where the first element is a positive-definite 
     scale matrix and the second element is a prior degrees of freedom with        . 
The regime-dependent variance and covariance matrix     is drawn from an inverse-Wishart 
distribution,      
  .(    )
  
    /. 
 
B.4 Gibbs Sampler Diagnostics 
We also undertake a diagnostic analysis that involves necessary checks if the 
generated posterior sample is drawn from a stationary distribution. Specifically, we evaluate 
the convergence of the MCMC simulation by means of the convergence diagnostic (CD) test 
statistic, proposed by Geweke (1992). This test statistic measures the equality of the means of 
the first and last part of a Markov chain. Consider the mean of   ̅    ⁄ ∑   
 
    of sequence 
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of         draws of a certain parameter   , where   denotes the size of the posterior 
sample. Following Koop (2003, Chapter 4), we divide the sequence   into three pieces,  
          (first piece),             (second piece) and            (third piece), 
and we discard the second piece. 
21
 
If the samples are drawn from a stationary distribution, then the means calculated 
from the first ( ̅ ) and third ( ̅ ) segments should not be statistically different, and the 
corresponding test statistic has an asymptotically standard normal distribution: 
   
 ̅   ̅ 
√    
      
 
 
  (   ),                    (B6) 
where     
  and     
  are the numerical standard errors squared.
22
 We calculate the test 
statistic for all the parameters of the model. Our samples have passed the convergence (at the 
5% significance level) for nearly all parameters.
23
 Results of the CD test are summarized in 
Table 6. 
– Please Insert Table 6 about here – 
                                                          
21
 According to Koop (2003, Chapter 4), the size of the first and third pieces is constrained by     ⁄      and 
(    )     , respectively. 
22
 The Gibbs sampler can be used to estimate the mean of a generic function  (  ). Geweke‟s method builds 
upon the assumption that the nature of the MCMC process and the function  (  ) imply the existence of a 
spectral density   ( ) for   draws of the function   with no discontinuities at frequency 0 (Cowles and Carlin 
1996). Then, for the estimator of  , (  )-,  ̅ , the asymptotic variance is   ( )  ⁄ , referred by Geweke to as 
the numerical standard error squared,     . 
23
 The mean absolute value of the CD statistic is 0.8354 (at 5% significance level, the critical value is ±1.96), 
and there are only 6 parameters (out if 123) that do not pass the convergence test. 
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Figures 
 
 
Panel A 
 
 
 
Panel B 
 
Figure 1. Developments in Credit Default Swap and Stock Markets 
 
Notes: Figure 1 depicts variation over time in the CDS market (Panel A) and in the stock market (Panel B). 
Panel B shows variation over time in levels (upper graph) and in changes (lower graph). The EUROSTOXX 
stock market index is on the left scale, and the VSTOXX volatility index is on the right scale. 
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Panel C 
 
 
Figure 2. Regimes in the Credit Default Swap Market  
 
Notes: Figure 2 identifies the Markov regimes (states), estimated using the MSBVAR model. Panel A depicts 
the low volatility regime. Panel B depicts the intermediate volatility regime. Panel C depicts the high volatility 
regime. Figure 2 also shows the developments in the CDS and stock markets during the three regimes. Regime 
probabilities are given by the smoothed estimates (in solid red line). A regime is defined as a region (or 
polygon) with the highest smoothed probability, i.e.,     
          (            ) (grey polygon). 
Regime 1 prevailed from the beginning of the sample (March 2005) till July 2007. In July 2007, the CDS 
market switched from regime 1 to regime 2. Regime 2 dominated the remainder of the sample and was only 
occasionally interrupted by regime 3, when the BCDS and SCDS spreads showed an accelerated increase and 
decrease with a turning point in the middle.  
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Panel C 
 
 
Panel D 
 
Figure 3. Regime-Dependent Impulse Response Functions 
 
Notes: This figure depicts the generalized impulse response functions of the endogenous variables of the 
MSBVAR in the low volatility, intermediate volatility and high volatility regimes (Regimes 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively). Panel A summarizes responses to a shock to BCDS spread. Panel B summarizes responses to 
SCDS spread. Panel C summarizes responses to a shock to VSTOXX volatility index. Panel D summarizes 
responses to a shock to EUROSTOXX stock market index. Confidence intervals show 2 standard deviations 
from the impulse responses. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 – Summary Statistics 
Panel A. Variables in levels 
Variables Obs Mean Median Max Min Std Skew Kurt JB Prob 
BCDS 2154 106.8703 101.3290 353.0000 7.0000 81.9862 0.5518 2.5016 131.5949 0.0000 
SCDS 2154 91.7861 97.0300 215.9170 20.0940 49.5823 0.2272 2.0670 96.6516 0.0000 
VSTOXX 2154 24.7843 22.575 87.51 11.720 10.176 1.7307 7.2344 2684.62 0.0000 
STOXX 2154 296.161 276.90 442.9 169.39 64.489 0.5963 2.3358 167.2398 0.0000 
IRS_1 2154 2.2545 1.7735 5.4790 0.1280 1.5541 0.4263 1.7779 199.2768 0.0000 
IRS_2 2154 2.4926 2.1700 5.5130 0.3090 1.3919 0.2957 1.8584 148.3588 0.0000 
IRS_3 2154 2.6351 2.4090 5.4450 0.4020 1.3142 0.1369 1.9218 111.0691 0.0000 
IRS_4 2154 2.7796 2.6290 5.3610 0.5530 1.2373 0.0020 2.0013 89.5122 0.0000 
IRS_5 2154 2.9166 2.8300 5.2810 0.7230 1.1627 -0.1050 2.0812 79.7167 0.0000 
IRS_6 2154 3.0423 3.0125 5.2130 0.8880 1.0966 -0.1918 2.1502 78.0304 0.0000 
IRS_7 2154 3.1545 3.1665 5.1650 1.0480 1.0415 -0.2608 2.2033 81.3919 0.0000 
IRS_8 2154 3.2530 3.2945 5.1390 1.2000 0.9969 -0.3118 2.2377 87.0514 0.0000 
IRS_9 2154 3.3397 3.3960 5.1260 1.3420 0.9612 -0.3492 2.2579 93.1922 0.0000 
IRS_10 2154 3.4173 3.4875 5.1210 1.4670 0.9316 -0.3786 2.2721 99.0034 0.0000 
IRS_12 2154 3.5496 3.6460 5.1330 1.6790 0.8850 -0.4275 2.2968 109.9771 0.0000 
IRS_15 2154 3.6832 3.8150 5.1410 1.8310 0.8443 -0.4794 2.3053 125.8313 0.0000 
IRS_20 2154 3.7614 3.9125 5.1150 1.8430 0.8284 -0.5225 2.2783 144.7544 0.0000 
IRS_25 2154 3.7473 3.8925 5.0850 1.8130 0.8265 -0.4750 2.1892 139.9947 0.0000 
IRS_30 2154 3.7082 3.8485 5.0690 1.7760 0.8281 -0.4024 2.0810 133.9404 0.0000 
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Panel B. Variables in first differences 
Variables Obs Mean Median Max Min Std Skew Kurt JB Prob 
BCDS 2154 0.0752 0.0000 52.4410 -63.1400 6.0316 -0.3859 17.0517 17775.6 0.0000 
SCDS 2154 0.0403 0.0000 22.8400 -39.4700 3.9713 -0.3527 12.8779 8801.83 0.0000 
VSTOXX 2154 0.0049 -0.0650 22.6400 -13.9800 1.9308 1.7316 27.5295 55078.9 0.0000 
STOXX 2154 -0.0032 0.0210 9.9621 -8.2498 1.4179 -0.0517 8.8382 3060.06 0.0000 
IRS_1 2154 -0.0010 0.0000 0.2860 -0.2150 0.0333 0.0892 13.5738 10037.4 0.0000 
IRS_2 2154 -0.0010 0.0000 0.3280 -0.2820 0.0415 0.1286 8.8275 3053.84 0.0000 
IRS_3 2154 -0.0010 0.0000 0.2910 -0.2950 0.0441 0.0841 7.2539 1626.62 0.0000 
IRS_4 2154 -0.0010 0.0000 0.2290 -0.2640 0.0438 0.0602 5.9112 761.943 0.0000 
IRS_5 2154 -0.0009 0.0000 0.2450 -0.2350 0.0437 0.0506 5.1904 431.506 0.0000 
IRS_6 2154 -0.0009 0.0000 0.2770 -0.2040 0.0431 0.0726 5.1932 433.600 0.0000 
IRS_7 2154 -0.0009 0.0000 0.3090 -0.1750 0.0428 0.1043 5.6372 628.111 0.0000 
IRS_8 2154 -0.0009 0.0000 0.3330 -0.1880 0.0428 0.1184 6.2777 969.232 0.0000 
IRS_9 2154 -0.0009 0.0000 0.3570 -0.2120 0.0430 0.1367 7.0433 1473.95 0.0000 
IRS_10 2154 -0.0009 0.0000 0.3790 -0.2350 0.0434 0.1450 7.8730 2138.80 0.0000 
IRS_12 2154 -0.0008 0.0000 0.4390 -0.2970 0.0443 0.2401 10.5165 5091.32 0.0000 
IRS_15 2154 -0.0008 0.0000 0.5060 -0.3560 0.0460 0.3823 14.4166 11750.3 0.0000 
IRS_20 2154 -0.0008 0.0000 0.5610 -0.3620 0.0485 0.5185 17.2527 18328.2 0.0000 
IRS_25 2154 -0.0008 0.0000 0.5960 -0.3440 0.0502 0.5622 18.7527 22384.7 0.0000 
IRS_30 2154 -0.0008 0.0000 0.6320 -0.3460 0.0522 0.5681 20.2324 26767.5 0.0000 
 
Notes: This table summarizes descriptive statistics (sample mean, median, maximum, minimum, standard deviation, skewness, excess kurtosis, the Jarque-Bera test statistic, 
and the p-value associated to the Jarque-Bera test statistic) of the European banks‟ credit default swap spread (BCDS, measured in basis points), the European sovereign 
credit default swap spread (SCDS, measured in basis points), the VSTOXX volatility index (VSTOXX, measured in index points), the EUROSTOXX stock index (STOXX, 
measured in percentage points), and the fixed-for-floating interest rate swaps (“you pay me a floating 3-month LIBOR interest rate, I pay you a fixed interest rate”) for 
maturities from 1 to 30 years (IRS_M, where “_M” denotes maturity, measured in annualized percentage points). The interest rate swaps are used to compute the first 
(“level”) and the second (“slope”) principal components. Panel A summarizes descriptive statistics of the aforementioned variables measured in levels. Panel B summarizes 
descriptive statistics of the variables in first differences (STOXX is measured in percentage change). The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013 that contains a total of 
2154 daily observations. 
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Table 2 – Unit Root Tests 
VARIABLES OBS 
ADF TEST KPSS TEST PP TEST ZA TEST 
CONST TREND CONST TREND CONST TREND CONST BREAK TREND BREAK 
BCDS 2154 -1.6233 -2.9923 28.476* 1.1049* -1.7481 -3.2981 -3.1318 2010/04/14 -5.1498* 2011/07/27 
SCDS 2154 -1.8319 -2.4593 21.738* 1.9238* -1.9375 -2.6790 -3.4945 2008/01/02 -3.4844 2007/10/16 
VSTOXX 2154 -3.3764* -3.4380* 6.6455* 3.2586* -3.9574* -4.0875* -4.3282 2007/12/27 -5.1131* 2008/09/03 
STOXX 2154 -1.1942 -1.9697 17.524* 2.5179* -1.2585 -2.0443 -4.1126 2008/05/20 -3.8712 2008/01/02 
IRS_1 2154 0.0546 -1.6708 22.886* 3.6751* 0.1508 -1.6980 -6.3002* 2008/09/26 -8.4582* 2008/09/26 
IRS_2 2154 -0.1083 -1.7228 23.717* 3.9587* -0.0829 -1.7415 -4.4253 2008/09/26 -5.9085* 2008/09/26 
IRS_3 2154 -0.1968 -1.7666 24.479* 4.3434* -0.1933 -1.7916 -3.6160 2008/09/26 -5.0162 2008/09/26 
IRS_4 2154 -0.2338 -1.7734 24.645* 4.6910* -0.2361 -1.7973 -3.1363 2008/09/26 -4.4963 2008/09/26 
IRS_5 2154 -0.2711 -1.7700 24.551* 4.9764* -0.2800 -1.7929 -2.8091 2008/09/26 -4.1967 2008/09/26 
IRS_6 2154 -0.3032 -1.7662 24.396* 5.2328* -0.3118 -1.7867 -2.5628 2008/09/26 -4.0304 2008/09/26 
IRS_7 2154 -0.3419 -1.7679 24.249* 5.4532* -0.3495 -1.7862 -2.4693 2011/05/06 -3.9600 2008/09/26 
IRS_8 2154 -0.3866 -1.7766 24.126* 5.6319* -0.3969 -1.7959 -2.5539 2006/12/05 -3.9560 2008/09/25 
IRS_9 2154 -0.4369 -1.7893 24.018* 5.7744* -0.4519 -1.8119 -2.6946 2006/12/05 -3.9870 2008/09/25 
IRS_10 2154 -0.4865 -1.8053 23.883* 5.8928* -0.5084 -1.8323 -2.8156 2006/12/05 -4.0257 2008/09/25 
IRS_12 2154 -0.5773 -1.8376 23.518* 6.0721* -0.6090 -1.8743 -3.0184 2006/12/05 -4.0943 2008/09/25 
IRS_15 2154 -0.6945 -1.8985 23.183* 6.1974* -0.7339 -1.9438 -3.2193 2006/12/05 -4.1665 2007/03/22 
IRS_20 2154 -0.8193 -2.0098 23.654* 6.1367* -0.8636 -2.0639 -3.3791 2006/12/07 -4.2255 2007/03/22 
IRS_25 2154 -0.9605 -2.1798 24.577* 5.6992* -0.9834 -2.2151 -3.4893 2006/12/07 -4.3690 2008/09/24 
IRS_30 2154 -1.0914 -2.3495 25.378* 5.2379* -1.0979 -2.3686 -3.5871 2006/12/07 -4.6317 2008/09/24 
SLOPE 2154 -1.1993 -1.8883 15.677* 3.1574* -3.4145 -1.8959 -6.1667* 2008/10/02 -6.0387* 2008/10/02 
 
Notes: This table summarizes results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS), Phillips-Perron (PP) and Zivot-Andrews (ZA) 
tests for a unit root. Under the ADF, PP and ZA tests, the null hypothesis is that the series features a unit root. Under the KPSS test, the null is that the series is stationary. 
The ADF (KPSS and PP) test equations comprise a constant (CONST) and both a constant and a trend (TREND), the 5% critical values being -2.8634  and -3.4145 (0.4630 
and 0.1460, -2.8634 and -3.4145), respectively. The 5% critical values for the ZA test are -4.8000 and -5.0800 under the assumption of a break in the constant (CONST) and 
in both the constant and the trend (TREND), respectively. The ZA test comprises a constant and a trend, while allowing for a single break in the constant (CONST) and in 
both the constant and the trend (TREND). The ZA test also provides the estimated break date (BREAK). Asterisk (*) indicates coefficients significant at the 5% or higher 
level of significance. The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013 that contains a total of 2154 daily observations. 
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Table 3 – Coefficients Of Correlation 
Variables BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX 
BCDS 1.0000 0.8227 0.4730 -0.5944 
SCDS 0.8227 1.0000 0.5860 -0.6898 
VSTOXX 0.4730 0.5860 1.0000 -0.7978 
STOXX -0.5944 -0.6898 -0.7978 1.0000 
IRS_1 -0.1263 -0.1623 -0.1660 0.1382 
IRS_2 -0.1987 -0.2444 -0.2059 0.2114 
IRS_3 -0.2242 -0.2671 -0.2234 0.2370 
IRS_4 -0.2395 -0.2741 -0.2251 0.2460 
IRS_5 -0.2510 -0.2789 -0.2255 0.2517 
IRS_6 -0.2602 -0.2799 -0.2255 0.2530 
IRS_7 -0.2698 -0.2808 -0.2255 0.2529 
IRS_8 -0.2755 -0.2791 -0.2241 0.2511 
IRS_9 -0.2787 -0.2765 -0.2223 0.2482 
IRS_10 -0.2806 -0.2740 -0.2201 0.2449 
IRS_12 -0.2820 -0.2710 -0.2171 0.2373 
IRS_15 -0.2805 -0.2666 -0.2159 0.2286 
IRS_20 -0.2724 -0.2576 -0.2145 0.2190 
IRS_25 -0.2687 -0.2539 -0.2113 0.2133 
IRS_30 -0.2651 -0.2502 -0.2083 0.2088 
 
Notes: This table summarizes the Pearson coefficients among the dependent and exogenous variables. All 
variables are in first difference (EUROSTOXX stock market index is in percentage change). The sample period 
is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013 that contains a total of 2154 daily observations. 
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Table 4 – Marginal Log-Likelihoods 
Variables 
Regimes 
(cols), 
Methods 
(rows) 
1 2 3 4 
BCDS BS -959.37 -928.41 -904.80 -912.55 
Chib -959.11 -927.98 -903.51 -910.02 
SCDS BS -984.70 -971.56 -953.39 -959.67 
Chib -984.52 -971.07 -952.44 -957.29 
STOXX BS -989.32 -981.24 -972.99 -975.92 
Chib -989.10 -980.65 -972.13 -973.21 
VSTOXX BS -884.09 -879.53 -862.44 -866.63 
Chib -883.86 -878.97 -861.80 -864.07 
 
Notes: This table summarizes the marginal log-likelihood values for bridge sampling (Meng and Wong 1996) 
and Chib‟s (1995) methods that are used to select among various models differing in the number of Markov 
regimes. The number of regimes is given in columns. The highest marginal log-likelihood value is highlighted 
in bold. The sample period is 22/03/2005 – 21/06/2013 that contains a total of 2154 daily observations. 
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Table 5 – Estimation Results 
Panel A. Coefficient estimates of exogenous variables (LEVEL = PC1, SLOPE = PC2) 
State Low  Volatility Middle Volatility  High Volatility  
Equations (cols), 
predictors (rows) 
BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX 
       -0.004308   
(0.003128) 
-0.022335*   
(0.006608) 
-0.035510* 
(0.012840) 
0.000180*   
(0.000051) 
-0.410049*   
(0.044823) 
-0.289575*   
(0.028660) 
-0.105170*   
(0.011928) 
0.000394*   
(0.000046) 
-0.695845*   
(0.122142) 
-0.476360*   
(0.082758) 
-0.208583*   
(0.042201) 
0.000629*   
(0.000121) 
       -0.001674   
(0.011769) 
0.075234*   
(0.026392) 
0.118808   
(0.050906) 
-0.000394*   
(0.000202) 
-0.292984*   
(0.109188) 
-0.121761   
(0.070261) 
-0.060787*   
(0.028938) 
0.000165   
(0.000110) 
-0.197803   
(0.342764) 
0.330842   
(0.233730) 
0.215780   
(0.120466) 
-0.000497   
(0.000342) 
Panel B. Coefficient estimates of the variance and covariance matrix 
Variances and 
covariances  
BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX 
BCDS 0.033311*   
(0.002406) 
   21.709597*   
(1.071273) 
   131.08600*  
(11.25193) 
   
SCDS 0.020444*   
(0.003767) 
0.163789*   
(0.010921) 
  11.632908*   
(0.623586) 
8.729875*   
(0.442355) 
  69.228344*   
(6.629798) 
59.745025*   
(5.041232) 
  
VSTOXX 0.010471*   
(0.006337) 
0.116196*   
(0.014912) 
0.621180*   
(0.037731) 
 2.926746*   
(0.212338) 
2.217390*   
(0.142085) 
1.559256*   
(0.073835) 
 18.921706*   
(2.826224) 
16.600610*   
(2.035725) 
15.892555*   
(1.380067) 
 
STOXX -0.000062*   
(0.000026) 
-0.000546*   
(0.000061) 
-0.002081*   
(0.000139) 
0.000010*   
(0.000001) 
-0.013011*   
(0.000834) 
-0.009970*   
(0.000562) 
-0.004851*   
(0.000246) 
0.000023*   
(0.000001) 
-0.076489*   
(0.008741) 
-0.058801*   
(0.006149) 
-0.035053*   
(0.003412) 
0.000128*   
(0.000011) 
Panel C. Estimated transition probabilities 
Low 0.917195* (0.013353) 0.035457* (0.006491) 0.016572* (0.008218) 
Middle 0.065859* (0.012212) 0.921021* (0.009767) 0.174433* (0.028154) 
High 0.016946* (0.006041) 0.043522* (0.007692) 0.808994* (0.028543) 
Panel D. Coefficient estimates of exogenous variables (LEVEL = IRS_5, SLOPE = IRS_10-IRS_2) 
Equations (cols), 
predictors (rows) 
BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX 
       -0.271198   
(0.238971) 
-1.887857*   
(0.520544) 
-3.328470*   
(1.016210) 
0.016621*   
(0.004038) 
-26.55779*   
(3.486721) 
-20.11069*   
(2.234848) 
-7.147764*   
(0.927679) 
0.027714*   
(0.003540) 
-66.62242*  
(10.90962) 
-46.71224*   
(7.257398) 
-19.25354*   
(3.750212) 
0.062165*   
(0.010695) 
       0.010473   
(0.020078) 
0.044699 
(0.044886) 
0.013698   
(0.085252) 
0.000013   
(0.000339) 
-0.262120   
(0.228710) 
-0.382652*   
(0.147776) 
-0.065110   
(0.061742) 
0.000583*   
(0.000234) 
0.497042   
(1.270638) 
0.153603   
(0.854366) 
-0.332376   
(0.439728) 
0.001056   
(0.001252) 
Notes: Panel A summarizes the estimated effects of the exogenous variables in the MSBVAR model. Credit default swaps and the volatility index are in first differences, and 
the stock market index is in first log-difference. In Panel A, LEVEL and SLOPE are the principal components on interest rate swaps in first differences. Panel B summarizes 
the estimated residual variance and covariance matrix. Panel C summarizes the estimated transition probabilities. The elements of the transition probabilities matrix are 
indexed according to    (
       
   
       
),  where       (           ) and ∑    
 
      for all        . In Panel D, LEVEL and SLOPE are the 5-year interest 
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rate swap, and the difference between 10-year and 2-year interest rate swaps. The estimated coefficient standard errors are provided in parentheses. Asterisk (*) indicates 
coefficients significant at the 5% or higher level of significance. 
 
Table 6 – Geweke’s  Test for Convergence Diagnostics for the MSBVAR Model 
Panel A. Coefficient estimates of the conditional mean 
State Low  Volatility  Middle Volatility  High Volatility  
Equations (in 
columns), 
predictors (in 
rows) 
BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX 
      1.588078 -0.121388 0.302845 -0.854201 0.195473 0.474492 -0.205195 -0.123615 -1.354168 -1.098942 -0.467640 0.116741 
        -0.514662 -1.949985 0.615100 -1.164118 -2.122899 -2.030775 1.230305 0.848046 -0.437183 1.065941 -0.107624 0.346869 
        1.898519 1.913460 0.555688 -0.356732 0.695109 1.508835 -1.102344 -0.094037 1.557627 -0.287325 -0.271169 -0.681326 
          -1.340192 0.444608 0.687256 -1.528116 0.142531 0.308209 0.981044 -0.909770 0.169732 1.282236 1.176771 -1.390332 
         0.579263 1.208924 1.412226 -1.576613 -0.337105 0.180561 0.484668 -0.144377 0.844522 1.064957 0.649835 -1.122415 
       1.108024 1.690854 0.111352 0.357669 0.627888 0.257798 0.120193 -0.764057 -2.435228 -2.141314 -1.082070 2.050298 
       -0.564224 1.492036 -0.434030 -0.688725 0.973561 0.464250 0.109763 -0.746655 2.401704 1.574654 0.858717 -1.912174 
Panel B. Coefficient estimates of the variance and covariance matrix 
State Low  Volatility  Middle Volatility  High Volatility  
Variances and 
Covariances  
BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX BCDS SCDS VSTOXX STOXX 
BCDS -0.181310    0.391166    -0.870456    
SCDS -1.290606 0.336606   1.178840 1.328869   -0.132640 0.096560   
VSTOXX -1.733400 -0.236674 -0.278135  0.454771 0.389028 -0.242417  -0.360529 0.545722 1.257695  
STOXX 1.651653 -0.139180 0.322103 0.002634 -0.753034 -0.577163 0.105807 0.020016 -0.021434 -1.017541 -1.758634 1.618755 
Panel C. Estimated Transition probabilities 
 Low  Volatility  Middle Volatility  High Volatility 
Low 0.967370  -1.912020 -0.519759 
Middle -0.722722 0.942298 0.845139 
High -1.093754 0.503790 -0.765985 
 
Notes: This table summarizes results of the convergence diagnostic test, proposed by Geweke (1992). The null hypothesis asserts that the coefficient is not statistically 
different in the first and in the third run of a Markov chain. Critical values are drawn from a standard normal distribution. Asterisk (*) indicates coefficients significant at the 
5% or higher level of significance.  
 
